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Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and Progressive Change
Linda C. McClain* and James E. Fleming**
I. Introduction: Against Juristocracy
We want to begin by marveling at the ambition, erudition, and passion of Ran Hirschl’s
powerful and sobering book, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism.1 Hirschl’s aim, roughly, is nothing less than to do for the world what Gerald
Rosenberg set out to do for the United States in The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change?2 That is, he aims to dispel what he views as the hollow hopes that constitutionalism and
judicial review will bring about progressive change around the world.
At the outset, though, we should note two differences between Hirschl’s and Rosenberg’s
projects. One, Rosenberg pointedly asked the question “Can courts bring about social change?” and
answered in the negative, whereas Hirschl instead asks “Have courts brought about progressive
2
3347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4410 U.S. 113 (1973).
economic change?” and concludes that they have not. Two, Rosenberg argued that courts cannot
bring about liberal social change, whereas Hirschl argues that courts have not brought about
progressive economic change: Rosenberg focused on the hollow hopes of liberals for social change
securing, e.g., racial equality (Brown v. Board of Education3) and women’s reproductive freedom
(Roe v. Wade4), while Hirschl focuses on hollow hopes for progressive economic change furthering
distributive justice and securing welfare rights.
Hirschl develops powerful and provocative arguments about the origins and consequences
of the new constitutionalism – the “rapid and astonishing transition to what may be called
juristocracy.” (1) By this coinage, he refers to the transfer of “an unprecedented amount of power
from representative institutions to judiciaries,” evident in the increasing adoption of judicial review,
even in countries that historically have resisted it. (1) The book is certain to engender serious
engagement with these arguments and it deserves to do so. In critiquing Hirschl’s analysis of
constitutionalism and judicial review, we shall focus on the three points sketched below. The first
two emphasize American constitutional theorists and jurists and the third looks primarily at
constitutionalization in Canada and South Africa. Although Hirschl’s focus is not on American
constitutional theorists and jurists or on American constitutional practice, he does suggest that
American justifications and practice of constitutionalism and judicial review have inspired other
countries to adopt constitutional limitations and judicial review. Thus, they are a brooding
omnipresence and warrant analysis for this reason.
1. Since when are constitutionalism and judicial review paths to progressive economic
3
5LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
change? Here we concede for the sake of argument that courts have not brought about progressive
economic change, but we question whether liberals and progressives in American constitutional law
ever harbored any hollow hopes that courts would do so.
2. The missing discourse of taking constitutions seriously outside the courts. Here we
concede that some American liberals and progressives have viewed the American Constitution as
securing welfare rights, but we contend that they have conceived these rights, not as judicially
enforceable, but as what Lawrence G. Sager calls “judicially underenforced norms.”5 These
American liberals and progressives have looked to legislatures, executives, and citizens generally
more fully to enforce these constitutional norms by taking the Constitution seriously outside the
courts. Strikingly, Hirschl’s analysis is so court-centered that he overlooks such discourse.
3. The neglected content of progressive social change. Here we suggest that Hirschl defines
progressive change too narrowly, as concerned with economic change, distributive justice, and
welfare rights. If he defined progressive change more broadly, to include challenges to the unequal
distribution of power and resources on the basis of gender and efforts to alter patterns of gender
inequality in institutions of civil society, such as the family, we might find that constitutionalization
and judicial review in the four countries he analyzes have been instrumental in bringing about some
progressive social change.
We also want to suggest that to some extent Hirschl is documenting the worldwide
resurgence of neoliberalism and anti-progressive views and their consequences in constitutional law.
What are the primary culprits for these developments? Is the problem the failure of constitutionalism
4
and judicial review to pursue progressive views or rather the resurgence of neoliberalism and anti-
progressive views? It is arguable that constitutionalism and judicial review of the form Hirschl
documents and criticizes are primarily consequences of those larger intellectual and political
developments. That is, the primary fault may lie with those developments, not with constitutionalism
and judicial review as such.
II. Hirschl’s Critique of Constitutionalization and Judicial Review
What, precisely, is Hirschl’s charge against constitutionalization and judicial review?
Proponents of judicial review, he claims, associate it with “liberal and/or egalitarian values” and
portray it as “a reflection of progressive social or political change.” (2) But the constitutionalization
of rights and judicial empowerment through such constitutionalization is a strategy of “hegemonic
preservation” by a confluence of elites: political, economic, and judicial elites. (11) Hirschl contends
that the “strategic interplay” between such elites – (a) “threatened political elites” seeking to insulate
policy making and their own policy preferences from the “vicissitudes of democratic politics,” (b)
“economic elites” seeking to limit government and to promote a “a business-friendly,” free-market
regime, and ( c) “judicial elites and national high courts” seeking “to enhance their political influence
and international reputation” – determines “the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional reform.”
(12)
This strategy, Hirschl contends, does not advance, and may impede, the pursuit of “social
justice.” (3) He puts to an empirical test the “near sacred” belief that “judicially affirmed rights are
a force of social change removed from the constraints of political power” (1) by looking at
constitutionalization in four countries: Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa. His book is
in the nature of an expose of the role of political elites in the embrace of constitutionalization and
5
judicial review to entrench and preserve their own power.
Several definitional questions arise. What does Hirschl encompass in the term “social
justice”? What is his definition of “progressive social or political change”? And does he treat
constitutionalization and judicial review as synonymous, thus not leaving room for any idea of taking
constitutions seriously outside the courts? 
Hirschl contends that “once we have settled on a given normative meaning of the term ‘social
justice’ (be it a collectivist-egalitarian, individualist-libertarian, or any other understanding of the
term),” determining whether democracy or constitutionalization better leads to its pursuit is
empirical. (3, emphasis added). His account centers on distributive justice: he investigates the impact
of constitutionalization of rights on high courts’ interpretive attitudes toward “progressive or
egalitarian notions of distributive justice.” (14) Do rights, he asks, protect and advance “progressive
notions of social justice” with respect to employment, housing, health, income distribution, and
education? (14) 
In contending that the answer is, generally, no, Hirschl finds that high courts are more willing
to protect negative liberties than to recognize positive rights. For example, the U.S. Supreme court
has an “impressive record” of protecting “classic civil liberties,” but “has been anything but a bastion
of progressive notions of distributive justice.” (101) As proof of the failure of constitutionalization
in other countries to advance progressive change, he points out that, in Israel, this process admitted
“no positive constitutional obligation” to “promote the provision of basic health care, housing or
education to all,” and it excluded “subsistence social and economic rights” as well as workers’ rights.
(63) Turning to South Africa, he reports that, in reaching a settlement allowing it to govern, and in
compromising to reassure economic elites, the leadership of the African National Congress (“ANC”)
6
6See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES
(1999).
7See AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000).
reneged on its “long term commitment to adopting a progressive-redistribution-oriented
constitutional regime.” (96) Subsequently, the government has supported “strict constitutional
protection of negative liberties at the expense of positive subsistence rights.” (96) Thus, although
South Africa alone, among his four examples, includes positive rights in the constitution, its
government has taken insufficient measures to realize them.
In explaining the limits of constitutionalism, Hirschl draws a contrast between “classic’ first
generation’ negative liberty” in the private sphere, which the courts zealously protect, and “classic
positive or ‘second generation’ rights,” such as “subsistence, social and economic rights such as the
right to health care, basic housing, education, social security and welfare, and an adequate standard
of living,” which they generally do not recognize or promote. (102) Put differently, courts zealously
protect rights to “freedom from interference,” but fail to protect “freedom to act in a positive way
(entailing the provision by some individual of a valued service).” Also neglected are “collective” or
“third generation” rights, which refer to “communal, rather than individual, entitlement to public
goods.” (105)
Drawing on basic needs arguments (like John Rawls’s6) and the human capabilities approach
(pioneered by Amartya Sen7), Hirschl intimates his own vision of how a progressive ideal should
inform catalogues of positive constitutional rights: governmental has an affirmative obligation to
provide persons the resources or essentials to live a decent life – “essential preconditions to the
enjoinment [sic] of any other rights and freedoms.” (126) He sharply disagrees with arguments that
7
8Drawing on Sen’s work, Hirschl contends that “constitutionalisation” has “failed to promote
the notion that no one can fully enjoy or exercise any classic civil liberties in any meaningful way
if he or she lacks the essentials for a healthy and decent life in the first place.” (151)
negative liberties should be justiciable, while positive rights should rest within the exclusive
discretion of legislatures or executives. (127) (We return to this matter in considering the missing
discourse of taking constitutions seriously outside the courts.) He argues that it is possible to
construe constitutional rights in certain constitutions as implicitly “protecting fundamental
subsistence social and economic rights,” but that high courts have “effectively deprived” such
positive rights of their “binding force” by not regarding them as “essential components of full
citizenship.” (128)8
The most striking example Hirschl offers is the interpretation of “human dignity” by Israel’s
high court. He juxtaposes Justice Barak’s protection of the right to property as connected to human
dignity – due to its role in enabling “security,” “individual financial freedom,” “interpersonal
cooperation,” and a person “activat[ing]” the autonomy of his personal will” (139) – with his
startling conclusion that “[s]ocial human rights such as the right to education, to health care, and to
social welfare are, of course, very important rights, but they are not, so it seems, part of ‘human
dignity.’”(136) 
Through these and other examples, Hirschl takes aim at the role of constitutionalism in
supporting, rather than challenging, the economic status quo, which favors the very elites who turn
to constitutions and to courts as a means of “hegemonic preservation.” Negative liberty claims
depend, for full realization, on “a broad definition of the private sphere by way of halting an
encroaching state.” (102) By contrast, positive rights claims (for example, workers’ rights to
8
unionize and strike) entail “greater state activity in amending disturbing market failures in the realm
of distributive justice.”(102) At odds with a progressive vision of positive rights is what Hirschl calls
an “antistatist conception of human rights.”(136) This neoliberal position “emphasizes the autonomy
of the economic sphere and its property rights and at the same time calls for the state’s withdrawal
from all labor relations and collective social and welfare spheres.” (146) To illustrate, Hirschl points
to high court rulings in Canada, Israel, and New Zealand concerning freedom of association and
freedom of occupation. (139-46)
In sum, Hirschl defines progressive change primarily in terms of economic redistribution and
concludes that juristocracy does not bring about such change. Proponents of the rights model, he
challenges, cannot point to evidence that “bills of rights, litigation, or jurisprudence has ever been
responsible for long-lasting and effective redistribution of resources and opportunities, let alone
sustained equalization of basic living conditions.” To the contrary, constitutionalization of rights has
often “served as an effective means for shielding the economic sphere from the potential hazards of
regulation and redistribution.” (153) Thus, “the impact of constitutionalization on the creation of
meaningful, enduring protection of the lower socioeconomic echelons of capitalist society is often
overrated,” for judicial interpretation of rights possesses limited capacity to “advance progressive
notions of distributive justice in arenas such as employment, health, housing, and education – areas
that require greater state intervention and more public expenditure and wealth redistribution.” (148)
Hirschl’s passionate attention to issues of economic redistribution is admirable, but his
conceptions of “social justice,” distributive justice,” and of what is “progressive” are too narrow.
These conceptions lead, in turn, to overlooking ways in which constitutionalization in the four
countries he studies has played a role in fostering social justice, more broadly conceived. We focus
9
9Diana Majury, The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration,
40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297 (2002).
on Canada and South Africa. As a related point, by practically conflating judicial review with
constitutionalization, and arguing that the former eviscerates the deliberative democratic processes
by removing certain issues from those processes, Hirschl overlooks important effects of
constitutionalization besides judicial review. For example, adopting a constitution authorizes
legislative bodies to pass laws aimed at fostering constitutional commitments, spurs citizens and
advocacy groups to seek political and legal reform, and informs the decisions of judges in matters
not directly implicating the constitution.
Finally, in attributing the political origins of constitutionalization to a strategy of preservation
by elites, Hirschl’s account seems to render insignificant the role played in the constitution-making
process by groups – not part of the trio of elites – such as women’s organizations that actively
worked to ensure that constitutional regimes would include core commitments to equality. So, too,
in contending that this confluence of elites shapes the effects of constitutionalization, Hirschl’s
account may overlook the role of other constitutional actors in shaping constitutional interpretation.
Further, although Hirschl makes a telling case concerning the impact of neoliberalism in hindering
gains in substantive equality, his steady focus on elites may divert attention from other reasons why
securing progressive social change is difficult, not the least of which is trying to reconcile seemingly
conflicting constitutional commitments. A broader view of progressive constitutionalism, we submit,
warrants a less grim assessment than Hirschl offers. In the words of one Canadian feminist scholar,
perhaps the more appropriate stance is one of “equivocation and celebration.”9
III. Since When Are Constitutionalism and Judicial Review Paths to Progressive Economic Change?
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The primary target of Hirschl’s attack is the claim that constitutionalism and judicial review
offer great promise for bringing about progressive economic change. Let us concede that they have
not in fact brought about such change. But since when are constitutionalism and judicial review
paths to progressive economic change? Has anyone in American constitutional law argued that they
are? No one to our knowledge has done so.
Let us begin with a multiple choice question about American constitutional theorists and
jurists: Who in American constitutional law has held the greatest hopes for constitutionalism and






The best answer? If you answered 1, Liberals, you get full credit. That is the best answer. If you
answered 5, Progressives, you get no credit. That is the worst answer. If you answered 2, 3, or 4, you
get partial credit.
In short, in American constitutional law, progressives have been the least likely folks to
harbor hollow hopes about constitutionalism and judicial review bringing about progressive change.
That is not necessarily to say that Hirschl has written a whole book criticizing a straw person. After
all, he is not primarily criticizing American constitutional theorists and jurists. It certainly could be
the case that liberal (as distinguished from progressive) court lovers in America have inspired
progressives in other countries to become court lovers who have hollow hopes about the promise of
11
courts to bring about progressive change. Indeed, as noted below, when Hirschl cites scholars who
seem to harbor or to inspire such hopes, he usually cites American scholars. Hence, in this section,
we will focus on the arguments of such scholars.
To be sure, liberal court lovers in American constitutional law have argued that
constitutionalism and judicial review are paths to liberal social change, e.g., to attaining racial
equality and women’s reproductive freedom. (These court lovers are the primary targets of
Rosenberg’s attack.) But let’s draw two distinctions here. One, the distinction between liberal and
progressive. And two, the distinction between social change and economic change. For now, we
have said all we plan to say on the latter distinction. We will return to it in Section V, in criticizing
Hirschl’s conception of progressive change as being too narrowly focused on economic change as
distinguished from social change, e.g., concerning gender norms and family law.
We want to sketch a schematic distinction between liberals and progressives. Let’s say that
liberals fear the state and view constitutionalist limitations on the state and judicial review enforcing
such limitations as protecting them from the state. This is the much-vaunted “freedom from,” or
negative liberty, that liberals are said to cherish. Such liberals also view the private realm, free from
state interference, as a realm of freedom. Throughout the book, Hirschl understands liberals in this
sense.
By contrast, let’s say that progressives love the state because they hope through using
political power to pursue distributive justice and to provide for everyone’s basic needs or to foster
everyone’s capabilities. Such progressives also fear private power and view the private realm,
shielded from state protection, as a realm of domination and oppression. Throughout the book,
Hirschl characterizes progressives in this way.
12
10See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW].
11RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN (1990).
12DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 10, at 36.
Obviously, this contrast is overdrawn. It is easy to think of many liberal progressives or
progressive liberals – we count ourselves among them – who blur or challenge this distinction. Still,
for analytic purposes, we will accept this distinction. Hirschl himself evidently is a progressive for
whom the distinction is real and important.
Are liberal court lovers guilty of viewing constitutionalism and judicial review as paths to
progressive economic change? Let’s look briefly at the work of three of the biggest liberal court
lovers we can think of, Ronald Dworkin, Lawrence Sager, and Charles Black. Each illustrates a
somewhat different, though characteristic, response to this question. First, consider Dworkin, liberal
court-lover extraordinaire. When Hirschl wants to cite to a particular court-lover who believes that
courts will secure rights and promote justice, he usually cites Dworkin, and with good reason. (2-3,
150) Dworkin propounds a moral reading of the American Constitution as a scheme of abstract
liberal principles of justice, and he argues that courts should aggressively enforce such principles
against legislative and executive encroachment.10 He also has advocated a bill of rights for Britain.11
Yet, notably, Dworkin does not believe that the American Constitution perfectly embodies
a liberal conception of justice. For one thing, he argues that the Constitution does not secure
economic justice or distributive justice.12 (Dworkin himself, however, develops a full-blown liberal
theory of economic justice that we as a people, acting through the legislative and executive branches,
13
13RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 11-119
(2000).
14DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 10, at 36.
15SAGER, supra note 5, at 70-83.
are morally obligated to pursue13). For another, Dworkin argues that the Constitution does not even
secure welfare rights, or persons’ minimal subsistence needs for food, shelter, health care, and
livelihood.14 (Dworkin again, though, argues that it is incumbent upon legislatures and executives,
as a matter of justice though not constitutional entitlement, to secure such needs for all.)
Indeed, Hirschl acknowledges that Dworkin argues that the American Constitution does not
secure distributive justice or welfare rights. (125) But he takes the occasion to criticize Dworkin for
the thinness of this view. Instead, this acknowledgment should have prompted Hirschl to reexamine
his assumption that liberal court lovers believe that constitutionalism and judicial review will
promote progressive economic change.
Second, what of Sager, liberal justice-seeking constitutionalist perhaps second only to
Dworkin in his court-loving propensities? According to Sager’s justice-seeking account, the
Constitution embodies general moral concepts and judges exercise independent normative judgment
in interpreting it; indeed, judges are partners with, rather than merely agents of, the constitutional
founders and amenders, and their joint project is to bring our political community closer to realizing
justice.15 Yet Sager reflects upon the thinness of constitutional law and, more particularly, the moral
shortfall of the judicially enforced Constitution. According to Sager’s “underenforcement thesis,”
certain constitutional principles required by justice are judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may
impose affirmative obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens generally
14
16Id. at 84-128.
17Id. at 95-102; Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 684-85. 
18SAGER, supra note 5, at 84-128.
19Id. at 129-60; Lawrence G. Sager, The Why of Constitutional Essentials, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1421, 1423-29 (2004) (using concentric circles to illustrate these four domains).
to realize them more fully.16
This view helps make sense of the evident thinness or moral shortfall of judicially
enforceable constitutional law as compared with our thicker or richer commitments to justice. For
example, instead of saying that the Constitution does not secure welfare rights – the move that
Dworkin makes – we can say, with Sager (and Frank Michelman), that the Constitution does secure
rights to minimum welfare, but it leaves enforcement of those rights in the first instance to
legislatures and executives. Once a scheme of welfare rights and benefits is in place, courts have a
secondary role in enforcing it equally and fairly.17 Sager also applies his underenforcement thesis to
analyze the constitutional obligation to repair the harms of historic injustice, including entrenched
racial and gender disadvantage.18
Sager distinguishes (1) judicially enforceable constitutional law (or the judicially enforced
Constitution) from (2) the domain of constitutional justice, which he in turn distinguishes from (3)
that of political justice and (4) that of morality generally.19 Imagine a series of progressively thicker
concentric circles representing these four domains. And note that the latter three domains are not
judicially enforceable but are left to enforcement in the Constitution outside the courts, by
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally.
We have noted that Sager views welfare rights as falling within the domain of constitutional
15
justice but outside the domain of the judicially enforced Constitution. Where does he put more
ambitious commitments to distributive justice? Those commitments lie in the domain of political
justice, beyond the domain of constitutional justice. Commitments in that domain are morally
incumbent, though not constitutionally obligatory, upon legislatures and executives. Sager does not
look to courts to further economic justice or distributive justice. Clearly, Sager, though he is an
avowed justice-seeker and court-lover, does not harbor hollow hopes that constitutionalism and
judicial review will bring about progressive economic change.
To what institutions does Sager look for vindication of welfare rights and pursuit of
distributive justice? To legislatures and executives. According to Sager, legislatures and executives
are under affirmative constitutional obligations to secure welfare rights. And we should view those
institutions as being under moral obligations to pursue distributive justice. 
Hirschl does not consider Sager’s justice-seeking account, with its rich and subtle view of
the thinness of the judicially enforced Constitution, or views like it. That is a significant omission,
to which we will return in the next section, on the missing discourse concerning constitutions outside
the courts.
Notwithstanding the counter-examples of Dworkin and Sager, two of the biggest liberal court
lovers around, Hirschl may insist that there surely are some liberal constitutional theorists or jurists
who believe that constitutionalism and judicial review promise to bring about progressive economic
change. Or, failing that, that surely some progressives entertain such hopes.
We know of no liberals who believe that the Constitution secures distributive justice. Not
John Rawls, who, like Dworkin and Sager, argues that principles of distributive justice, though
required by justice, are not “constitutional essentials” in a constitutional democracy like that of the
16
20JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 229 (1993).
21Id. at 228-29.
22CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 131-39 (1997).
23SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
United States, and certainly are not judicially enforceable in the absence of legislative and executive
action.20 Rawls, like Sager and Michelman, does argue that welfare rights are “constitutional
essentials.”21 Yet he no more than they argues that such rights are judicially enforceable in the
absence of legislative and executive action.
But surely Black, a passionate champion of “the constitutional justice of livelihood”22 and
many other good things, believed that constitutionalism and judicial review promise progressive
economic change. He does argue that the Constitution (in the Preamble, the Ninth Amendment, and
the empowerment of Congress to provide for the general welfare), together with the Declaration of
Independence, commit us to pursuing a constitutional justice of livelihood, or to securing
constitutional rights to minimal subsistence (short of full distributive justice). Even Black, however,
stops short of arguing that the constitutional justice of livelihood is judicially enforceable in the first
instance. Instead, he argues that the Constitution imposes affirmative obligations upon legislatures
and executives, especially those of the federal government, to afford minimal entitlements in order
to provide for the general welfare. In this vein is also the ambitious book of Sotirios A. Barber,
Welfare and the Constitution.23
So far, we have focused on liberals as distinguished from progressives, though all of these
liberals, like progressives, are strongly committed to views that the state has affirmative obligations
to pursue distributive justice (as opposed to being anti-statists who fear the state and love their
17
24Cf. Michael Herz, “Do Justice!”: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111
(1996) (referring to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s positivist conception of law as that of a
“justice-hater”).
25198 U.S. 45 (1905).
negative liberties). Next, we shall turn to American constitutional theorists who are undoubtedly
progressives, or at least more progressive than liberal. Are there progressives who believe that
constitutionalism and judicial review promise to bring about progressive economic change? Not to
our knowledge.
Let’s consider several prominent progressives: Mark Tushnet, Robin West, and Mary Becker.
And let’s include Cass Sunstein here. Each illustrates certain characteristic progressive conceptions.
Progressives in American constitutional law, to put the matter dramatically and colloquially, have
tended to hate judicial review even if not to hate the Constitution.24 In earlier generations,
progressives were traumatized by the era of Lochner v. New York25 – and the Supreme Court’s
aggressive judicial protection of a libertarian conception of economic liberties against progressive
legislation by both the national government and the state governments. Hence, they viewed
constitutionalism and judicial review with great suspicion: even if they did not call for abolition of
judicial review, they did advocate judicial deference to the political processes, especially to the
national political processes.
Some may think that the Warren Court changed all this, and turned progressives like liberals
into court lovers. We don’t think so. Progressives of today still typically are quite wary of the legacy
of Lochner, and they typically fear, in Sunstein’s well-known formulation, that courts are more likely
to enforce status quo neutrality against progressive change than they are to vindicate basic liberties
that are preconditions for a progressive deliberative democracy, including freedom from desperate
18
26See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 68-92 (1993).
27CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999).
28SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 137-40; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:
FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004).
29MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
conditions or welfare rights.26 Furthermore, Sunstein has been tireless in warning that liberal court
lovers who expect courts to be a forum of principle vindicating liberal moral principles (much less
progressive moral principles) suffer from myopia caused by idolatry concerning the Warren Court.
He argues that, historically, legislatures and executives have been superior fora to courts for realizing
liberal or progressive commitments. Accordingly, Sunstein calls for judicial minimalism, or for
courts to leave things undecided in order to allow democratic deliberation to proceed, even when
courts are enforcing what are undoubtedly judicially enforceable constitutional commitments.27
Sunstein also argues, like Sager, Michelman, Rawls, and Black, that the Constitution does protect
welfare rights, but that such rights are judicially underenforced: Their fuller enforcement lies in the
Constitution outside the courts, where legislatures and executives are under affirmative obligations
to secure them.28
Another characteristic progressive move is powerfully illustrated by Mark Tushnet. Far from
arguing that constitutionalism and judicial review promise to bring about progressive economic
change, Tushnet calls for “taking the Constitution away from the courts.”29 He argues that the
Constitution – not just positive welfare rights but even negative liberties – is self-enforcing through
the political processes. He also argues that the Constitution is quite thin – even thinner than Sager
contends. And so, far from committing us to judicial pursuit of distributive justice or even protection
19
30ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (1994).
31Mary Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights”: A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992); Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a
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of welfare rights, the thin Constitution commits us to vindicating the principles of the Declaration
of Independence and to the parts of the Constitution’s Preamble that resonate with the Declaration:
“establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to . . . our [P]osterity.” For Tushnet, it is up to
the people themselves, not courts through judicial review, to reflect upon and vindicate their
understandings of these commitments.
Robin West, though she does not go all the way with Tushnet in advocating taking the
Constitution away from the courts, illustrates a more general characteristic progressive move: She
argues that the Constitution does embody abstract progressive commitments, and does impose
affirmative obligations to secure positive liberties, equality, and justice, but she calls for legislatures
and executives rather than courts to vindicate these commitments.30 Once again, we come to
progressive calls for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts.
Finally, Mary Becker illustrates another not uncommon progressive move: Again, to put it
dramatically and colloquially, she not only hates judicial review (as many other progressives do), she
also hates the Constitution (unlike many progressives). More precisely, Becker not only harbors no
hollow hopes that constitutionalism and judicial review will bring about progressive economic and
social change, she also argues that the Constitution in many respects protects the wrong rights and
stands in the way of progressive change.31 Her focus is less on how the American Constitution
thwarts the pursuit of distributive justice and welfare rights than on how the Constitution and judicial
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review enforcing constitutional rights have actually harmed women.
Obviously, we have not canvassed all liberals and progressives to see if anyone in American
constitutional law really believes that constitutionalism and judicial review promise to bring about
progressive economic change. But we have discussed prominent liberal court-loving accounts that
view the Constitution as embodying abstract commitments to justice; prominent liberal and
progressive arguments that the Constitution protects welfare rights; and characteristic progressive
moves. None of the constitutional theorists whom we considered harbors hollow hopes that
constitutionalism and judicial review will bring about progressive economic change. Hirschl seems
to presume that American constitutional theorists and jurists have inspired theorists and jurists in
other countries to justify constitutionalism and judicial review on the ground that they will help bring
about progressive change. Yet he does not analyze particular arguments by particular scholars or
jurists in other countries contending (or even presupposing) that they will help do so. 
And so, we return to our opening challenge to Hirschl: since when are constitutionalism and
judicial review paths to progressive economic change?
IV. The Missing Discourse of Taking Constitutions Seriously Outside the Courts
In making our first point, we already have previewed our second, concerning the missing
discourse of taking constitutions seriously outside the courts. Dworkin, for Hirschl, exemplifies
liberal constitutionalism. Thus, Hirschl remarks on Dworkin’s focus on the courts as guarantors of
constitutional rights and exclusion of certain positive rights from the ambit of constitutional rights.
(127) As we have shown, however, significant strands of liberal and progressive constitutional theory
are less centered on courts and more receptive to positive constitutional rights. Above, we saw that
every liberal or progressive constitutional theorist we examined who believes that the American
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Constitution secures welfare rights also argues that such rights are not judicially enforceable in the
first instance, in the absence of legislative and executive action. All argued that welfare rights
impose affirmative constitutional obligations upon legislatures and executives to secure them in the
realm of the Constitution outside the courts. (To be sure, many liberals and progressives would leave
the Constitution out of it and simply argue for distributive justice and welfare rights on the basis of
justice or normatively attractive policy.) On these theorists’ views, assessing the impact of
constitutionalism would require looking at the fate of constitutional rights not only as interpreted by
courts but also as implemented by legislatures and executives.
Hirschl completely ignores this discourse – the very core of progressive constitutional
discourse in the United States in recent years, as well as the locus of liberal constitutional discourse
concerning welfare rights. In adopting a court-centered methodology, Hirschl overlooks the interplay
of courts and legislature in implementing constitutional rights. His failure to engage with such
discourse about constitutions outside the courts is the greatest theoretical shortcoming of the book.
And his failure to do so is doubly problematic for his critique. For one thing, as we have seen, he
mistakenly believes that liberals and progressives look to constitutionalism and judicial review to
pursue distributive justice and to secure welfare rights. We already have said enough on this point.
For another, Hirschl presumes that we are going to have to look to legislatures and executives, not
to courts, to pursue distributive justice and to secure welfare rights – yet he evidently does not view
legislatures and executives securing welfare rights as discharging obligations grounded in the
Constitution as distinguished from obligations rooted in justice. If so, his account may imply that if
welfare rights are not judicially enforceable, they are constitutionally gratuitous rather than
constitutionally obligatory as far as legislatures and executives are concerned. Put another way, his
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account may entail that welfare rights are purely a matter of justice or morality, not constitutional
commitment. The lesson we take from the liberals and progressives we have discussed is that there
are good reasons instead to view the American Constitution as embodying commitments to welfare
rights but as leaving their enforcement to legislatures and executives.
Hirschl may view the judicial underenforcement thesis and conceptions of taking
constitutions seriously outside the courts as cop outs – again, he pointedly questions arguments that
negative liberties should be justiciable, while positive rights should rest within the exclusive
discretion of legislatures or executives (127) – but he should not. Only a committed court-lover
should view such conceptions as cop outs. Hirschl instead should be heartened by these conceptions.
For they entail that important questions of distributive justice should be addressed by legislatures
and executives in the first instance, not by courts. And these conceptions entail confidence in the
capacities of legislatures and executives, more than courts, to honor and to further commitments to
distributive justice.
V. The Neglected Content of Progressive Social Change: Whither Gender Equality?
Thusfar, we have focused on Hirschl’s conception of progressive change as progressive
economic change as distinguished from social change. But there are also, in Hirschl’s rendering of
the contrast between neoliberalism and progressivism, glimmerings of a broader view of progressive
social justice that includes more than economic redistribution. For example, Hirschl contends that
high courts “tend to regard state regulation as a threat to human liberty and equality, and more so
than the potentially oppressive and exploitative social relations and institutions of the so-called
private sector.” (146-47). This passage brings to mind prominent feminist accounts of progressive
constitutionalism as fearing private power as a source of oppression. 
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For example, writing of the American constitutional debate, West suggests a basic contrast
between conservative and progressive constitutionalism. She focuses on how they assess various
forms of social and private power – and the normative authority to which they give rise – and
whether the Constitution and constitutional adjudication should be a means of preserving or
challenging such power and authority:
Progressive constitutionalists . . . view the power and normative authority of some
social groups over others as the fruits of illegitimate private hierarchy and regard the
Constitution as one important mechanism for challenging those entrenched private
orders. Where the conservative is likely to see in a particular social or private
institution a source of communitarian wisdom and legitimate normative authority, the
progressive is likely to see the product of social or private hierarchy, and the patterns
of domination, subordination, and oppression that inevitably attend to such
inequalities of power.32 
Thus, while Hirschl’s book focuses overwhelmingly on private power in the form of unjust economic
relations, West’s definition encompasses social and private power more broadly. In particular,
feminists have focused on problems of sex inequality and domination in “private” life, including not
only families but also other institutions of civil society. Crediting such feminist views, one of us has
developed a vision of government’s formative responsibilities that includes not only freedom from,
or a right to noninterference by government, but also freedom to, or affirmative obligations of
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government to provide for certain basic needs and address problems of unjust hierarchy.33 But, as
mentioned above, for progressives like West, implementing a progressive constitutionalism should
fall more to citizens, legislatures, and executives than to courts. On this view, the best measure of
the impact of constitutionalism would look not narrowly at adjudication, but broadly at issues
intimated by the coinage “constitutions outside the courts.”
Might Hirschl’s analysis reach different conclusions if he approached the impact of
constitutionalism with a broader conception of progressive social justice in mind? Such a conception
should include the important interplay between freedom to and freedom from. It should also include
a focus on questions of distribution of private and social power, not just economic redistribution.
For example, what is the impact on such power relations of the embrace of a constitutional guarantee
of sex equality and an anti-discrimination principle? 
Neither sex equality nor the redistribution of power within the family and civil society in light
of sex equality is among the “four key issues” that Hirschl studies in assessing the consequences of
constitutionalization for advancing “progressive concepts of distributive justice.” His sampling
includes two categories of negative, or procedural rights (criminal due process rights and
jurisprudence concerning freedom of expression and “formal equality in the context of sexual
preference”) and two categories of positive rights (subsistence social and economic rights and
freedom of association and occupation with respect to labor relations). (102) Why this omission?
Opening pathways to liberty and equality previously denied to women would seem to be a form of
“distributive” justice. Reviewing regulations of the family in light of constitutional principles often
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leads to adjustment of rights and responsibilities as between women and men and, in this sense,
might be redistributive of power. Moreover, progressive feminist scholars (for example, West and
Becker), in their critique of court-centered constitutionalism, share Hirschl’s concern about courts’
inattention to the private sphere as a source of oppression and exploitation. On these feminist views,
one measure of the potential – of lack thereof – of courts to foster progressive social change would
be the impact of judicial review on addressing domination in the private sphere.
The absence of gender as a salient category of analysis in Hirschl’s book appears to reflect
a bigger limitation of much comparative constitutional law. In their recent collection, The Gender
of Constitutional Jurisprudence, feminist scholars Beverly Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin contend:
“There is a hug gap – a gender gap – in contemporary constitutional analysis.”34 In such analysis,
questions about women as constitutional agents and when and how the constitution-making and
constitution-interpreting processes can recognize and protect women’s rights slip through the cracks
because they do not seem to fit typical categorization of the issues (for example, federalism, judicial
review, and the like).35 We accept that feminist constitutionalism is not Hirschl’s project and do not
fault him for not writing the book that feminist comparative constitutionalists might have written.
However, to the extent his book claims to offer an assessment of the potential of constitutionalism
to bring about progressive social change, the omission of gender as a meaningful category limits the
book’s diagnostic value. 
We contend that constitutionalism’s impact upon redistributing power between women and
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men in the private sphere – for example, in families and other institutions of civil society – should
fit within the umbrella concept of progressive social change. If we are correct, then Hirschl’s
omission of these topics points to work that remains to be done in order to offer (as he puts it) “a
realistic assessment of current potential for advancing progressive concepts of social justice through
constitutionalization of rights and rights litigation.” (101) We now illustrate the difference that such
a broader conception of progressive social change might make by looking at some specific issues of
sex equality in Israel, Canada, and South Africa.
Israel: Religious Family Law and the Controversy Surrounding “the Women of the Wall”
In studying juristocracy in Israel, Hirschl gives some attention to the impact of
constitutionalization on the status of women in family law and civil society. (We put to one side, for
the moment, his discussion of gains in formal equality for gay men and lesbians.) But, here, his
purpose is to illustrate the hegemonic preservation thesis at work: “antireligious” adjudication by
Israel’s high court provides a “safe haven” for threatened “secularist-libertarian elites” amidst “the
growing influence of traditionally peripheral groups in Israel’s majoritarian policy-making arenas.”
For example, that court has overturned rulings by the rabbinical court system pertaining to family
law, declared unconstitutional (on equality grounds) “the exclusion of women and non-Orthodox
representatives from religious councils and the electoral groups that selected candidates for religious
councils,” and redefined prayer rights, “including the abolition of a centuries-old practice that
allowed men only to hold prayer services at the Western Wall.” (67-68)
Hirschl’s analysis of these cases is puzzling and problematic. Judged by the broader
conception of progressive social justice we propose, at least some of these outcomes seem
progressive. In Israel, both a Jewish and democratic state, there is no formal separation of church and
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state, and religious courts have long had jurisdiction over matters of personal status including family
law. Patriarchal aspects of Orthodox Judaism’s law pertaining to marriage and divorce stand in
tension with national and constitutional norms of gender equality and women’s equal status under
the law – a tension resolved in the earlier, nation-building stage by exempting family law and
personal status law from the reach of such norms.36 As Baines and Rubio-Marin argue, of particular
concern to feminists has been such decisions “to recognize customary or religious jurisdiction over
certain relationships, often including those which are the most intimate and intense, such as
marriage, divorce, custody, property, and succession.”37 In other writing, Hirschl himself argues that,
in giving religious communities in Israel this jurisdiction, “the state has granted these communities
a license to maintain intragroup practices that disproportionately injure vulnerable group members,
such as women” and he has identified “the fundamental problem of women’s heightened
vulnerability to gender discrimination in the religious divorce process.”38 Viewed in this light, it
seems at least arguable that efforts by Israel’s high court to limit religious courts’ authority and insist
upon compliance with norms of gender equality are progressive by challenging forms of hierarchy
in the “private” sphere that have been sanctioned by the state. Indeed, in an essay included in Baines
and Rubio-Marin’s volume, Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar conclude that “a major obstacle to
establishing women’s full participation as equals in all spheres of life in Israel . . . continues to be
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the intersection of gender and religious/national tensions,” and use the label “progressive” to refer
to efforts at law reform that would redress such gender inequality.39 Hirschl and Shachar usefully
acknowledge obstacles to securing gender equality, both in the form of “intragroup pressure” that
women face when they seek remedies for constitutional rights violations by other group members
(including family members) and in the form of strong resistance by religious authorities and
legislators to judicial opinions that we might call “progressive” with respect to sex equality.40 In
Hirschl’s book, by contrast, gender equality does not clearly feature as progressive, and judicial
efforts to advance it seem to fit uneasily as evidence of the hegemonic preservation thesis at work.
The “Women of the Wall” controversy also seems to call for a different interpretation than
that offered by Hirschl. He contends that it illustrates how the move to constitutionalization has
shifted the burden of addressing Israel’s “secular-religious cleavage” to the courts. As he recounts
the controversy: several years of political deliberation failed to solve the problem that a group of
observant Jewish women, “Women of the Wall,” sought the right to pray together at the Western
Wall “in a minyan – a religious quorum traditionally reserved for men.” (176) This practice was not
“acceptable to ultra-Orthodox Jews” and therefore the “Rabbi of the Wall” (a state-nominated
official authorized to regulate prayer at the Wall) prohibited it. Initially, Hirschl recounts, the high
court ruled that, when gender equality and religious beliefs conflict, the latter should be given
preference to avoid confrontations at the Wall. But the court urged government to find a fair solution.
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When subsequent efforts failed to yield an acceptable agreement, the court once again heard the
equality-based challenge by the Women of the Wall. This time, it “reversed its original decision,”
ruling in favor of the Women of the Wall and ordering government to make the technical
arrangements for them to “pray as they wished while minimizing the disturbance to other
worshipers.” After a government appeal, the court issued a revised ruling ordering that government
designate the adjacent area of Robinson’s Arch for the group’s prayer. (176) 
First of all, it seems inapt to characterize a dispute between groups of observant Jews over
prayer rights as illustrating a “secular-religious cleavage.” Perhaps it might appear so from the
perspective of those Orthodox Jews who regarded any apparent deviation from tradition and custom
as a step towards secularism. However, the dispute seems to be an example of religious dissent, that
is, a struggle over how best to interpret religious tradition. The Women of the Wall, for example,
argued that even though the practices they embraced – wearing prayer shawls, carrying a Torah
scroll, and praying together out loud – conflicted with certain interpretations of Orthodox Judaism,
other interpretations of Jewish law allowed their practices.41 They situate themselves within the
development of halakhic women’s prayer groups (that is, women’s tefilah groups within Orthodox
Judaism).42 Indeed, although Women of the Wall includes Jewish and Israeli women from different
strands of Judaism, they consciously have not sought to form a minyan and instead have sought to
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pray in a way compatible with the most halachically conservative among their members.43 While
some members of WOW and the support group, International Women of the Wall, have viewed their
goal as opening up a more pluralistic and egalitarian vision of Jewish practice, others have
understood their goal as bringing about incremental change within Orthodoxy.44 
Second, the dispute was not simply an internal religious dispute. It raised the question of
women’s equal access to and use of a public space and an important national and religious symbol,
one maintained and paid for by the state. As WOW attorney Frances Raday argues, “the prohibition
of women’s public recital of prayers from the Torah, which is so central to Jewish culture and
community, is a further manifestation of the exclusion of women from the public sphere and public
functions.”45 Hirschl also does not comment on the level of violence to which WOW was subjected
by the ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and women who opposed their practices, including cursing,
spitting, and hurling chairs and tables on them, while police often did not provide protection.46 Such
violence ensued even though WOW “accepted the tenet of orthodox Judaism which separates men
from women in the public sphere,” but simply sought – within the women’s section at the Wall – to
pray in accordance with the group’s custom.47 Raday interprets this violent opposition as attempts
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by “fundamentalist religious activists to preserve their patriarchal hegemony.”48 
Third, Hirschl treats the subsequent court rulings as a victory for women’s equality over
religious beliefs, but members of the Women of the Wall and their lawyers took a different view.
They deemed the court’s remedy of relegating them to a different area, away from the Wall, as
“separate and unequal” and treating the women as “second class citizens.”49 Further, Raday critiqued
the tension between the court’s rhetoric of liberalism and human rights and its acceptance of “the
most narrow, exclusionary interpretations of Jewish law.”50 Thus, although the Court determined that
the women had a right to pray in accordance with their custom, its ultimate remedy of ordering that
the prayer take place elsewhere stemmed from concern over the women’s prayer giving offense to
the feelings of other worshipers and inciting violence, thus being a danger to public safety.51 As
Sherry Colb observes, this seems to draw a troubling analogy between women’s prayer and the sort
of “fighting words” that may be regulated or prohibited because they may disrupt public order.52 
In view of these different aspects of the Women of the Wall controversy, it seems inapt to
view it as illustrating how judicial rulings entrench “elite” or secular preferences or resolve Israel’s
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“secular-religious cleavage.” Notably, WOW’s struggles garnered little understanding or support by
secular Israelis, including feminists.53 It seems more apt to view the controversy as the sort of
challenge that faces courts when dissenters within cultural or religious groups seek to invoke
constitutional principles to support their interpretive claims. Thus, Amy Gutmann argues that the
Women of the Wall illustrated courageous dissent by risking their safety to publicly oppose “state-
sanctioned discrimination” and seek civic equality.54 So viewed, is their challenge – and the court’s
resolution – progressive? Perhaps so, since the court affirms the group’s right to prayer at an
important public space, thus advancing the goal of redistributive justice between women and men.
Perhaps not, since the resolution favors the status quo by requiring the dissenters to go elsewhere
rather than empowering them to share that public space with their opponents. Perhaps the
controversy illustrates the difficult challenges posed when government must address “internal”
religious disputes; but it may also highlight the difficulty of reconciling competing religious
freedoms – freedom of access to “holy sites” and freedom from offense to the feelings of religious
persons toward those sites.55
Finally, the Women of the Wall controversy seems an odd target of Hirschl’s critique of the
“troubling” trend in Israel (and the other countries he studies) of shifting “foundational nation-
building questions to the judiciary,” thus denying “We the People” the chance to resolve contentious
political questions through “informed public deliberation and citizen participation.” (186-87) Hirschl
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himself notes more than one protracted stage of deliberative impasse during the controversy (which
started in 1988). This long history includes the Minister of Religion adopting a regulation barring
religious ceremonies against the “custom” of the site and which offend worshipers’ sensitivities and
a legislative proposal in the Knesset to impose seven-year jail sentences on women who, in the
women’s section at the Wall, engaged in religious ceremonies of the sort embraced by WOW.56 Such
history counsels skepticism about whether a more progressive resolution would have emerged
through the deliberative process alone. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
When Canadian feminists and female jurists assess the impact of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms upon women’s equality, they stress women’s constitutional agency as lobbyists,
advocating for inclusion of equality rights in the Charter, and as litigators, seeking to shape
constitutional interpretation of such equality rights in terms of substantive equality.57 As lobbyists,
women’s organizations played a significant role in shaping the language of the Charter’s equality
provisions, seeking to ensure not simply formal equality, but substantive equality. Here, Canadian
feminists learned from the limitations of U.S. equality jurisprudence. And, subsequent to the
adoption of the Charter, Canadian women “understood that they would need to follow up with a
multifaceted ‘Charter-watching’ strategy” that has included bringing test cases, engaging in public
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education campaigns, and generating academic writing about equality.58 Illustrative of this strategy
is the formation of the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”).
As judges have applied the Charter, they have adopted a substantive definition of equality,
which looks not only at formal equality, or the question of similar treatment for those who are
similarly situated, but also makes a contextual analysis of such issues as historical patterns of
discrimination and “whether the challenged legislative provisions perpetuate negative stereotypes
and discrimination, either intentionally or by adverse effect.”59 This contextual approach, Justice
L’Heureux-Dube (a former justice on the Canadian Supreme Court) argues, “has begun to inject the
experience of historically marginalized groups into the notoriously disembodied and acontexual
world of law.”60 Other assessments of the Charter affirm that a more complex, substantive equality
approach has become the operative model at work in Canadian constitutional law.61 As feminist
scholar Diane Majury characterizes this approach: “Substantive equality recognizes that in order to
further equality, policies and practices need to respond to historically and socially based differences.
Substantive equality looks to the effects of a practice or policy to determine its equality impact,
recognizing that in order to be treated equally, dominant and subordinated groups may need to be
treated differently.”62 Human rights jurisprudence was an important factor both in shaping the
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Charter and in shaping judges’ interpretation of it. Such jurisprudence stresses not only the
importance of freedom from an intrusive state, but also freedom from discrimination and a
conception of human dignity that recognizes that human beings need the means necessary for full
and equal participation in society.63 This emergence of substantive equality seems to counter
Hirschl’s claim that high courts exalt formal equality and an unregulated private sphere and shun
governmental efforts to foster substantive equality. In this respect, a surprising omission from
Hirschl’s discussion of speech cases decided under the Charter is R. v. Butler, in which the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld criminal prohibition on materials containing an “undue exploitation of sex”
on a rationale of deterring violence against women and fostering true equality between women and
men.64 
Assessments of the impact of the Charter on women’s equality also point to the risks of
conflating constitutionalization and judicial review. To be sure, one impact of the Charter has been
direct constitutional challenges brought in courts, contending that various legislative provisions
violate Charter guarantees. But there have been other impacts as well. One is that “some
governments have reviewed and amended their legislation in order to ensure that statutory provisions
comply with the Charter.” In this respect, Susan Boyd argues, governments have focused on formal
equality, making sure, for example, that family law statutes are facially neutral and that men and
women have reciprocal obligations.65
Another impact is on judicial discretion more generally: “the Charter has been invoked
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indirectly to argue that, even in the absence of the required element of government or state action,
judges must nevertheless in this situation take into account the fundamental values (such as equality)
that are enshrined in the Charter.”66 Even though the Charter applies to the legislature and to
government, some Supreme Court decisions suggest that courts should develop the law in all fields
in a way consistent with charter values.67 Boyd offers the example of judicial interpretation of
spousal support laws, pointing out how, in Moge v. Moge (perhaps influenced by LEAF’s
arguments), the Court took judicial notice of women’s impoverishment at divorce, and of how men’s
earning capacity benefits in part from their female partners’ work in the home.68 As Justice
L’Heureux-Dube explains her majority opinion in that case: “Canvassing socio-economic research,”
she “engaged in statutory interpretation without direct application of the Charter, but with equality
values at the forefront nonetheless.” The Court rejected Mr. Moge’s argument that a support model
should be based pre-eminently on self-sufficiency, pointing to other criteria included in the Divorce
Act, such as economic disadvantage, financial consequences arising from child care, and economic
hardship.69 Moge’s emphasis upon the feminization of poverty and on the economic consequences
flowing from marriage or marriage-like relationships has influenced subsequent Supreme Court of
Canada cases involving aspects of family law.70 However, recognizing how the gendered dynamics
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of family life have shaped family law did not prevent the Court from concluding, in M v. H, that a
lesbian partner in an intimate same-sex relationship should be entitled – under the Charter’s equality
guarantees – the same as married partners or unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants, to claim spousal
support.71 There, the Court affirmed the law’s gender-neutral approach in protecting vulnerable
persons in light of the interdependencies that arise in intimate relationships.
To be sure, an approach to family law stressing substantive equality has not been consistently
adopted, and “formal equality still retains significant influence.”72 Nonetheless, if tenets of a
progressive approach to rights include attending to problems of unequal power and resources in the
private sphere, then Canadian jurisprudence seems to suggest a more progressive approach to rights
than Hirschl’s grim assessment would acknowledge. Consider, for example, former justice Bertha
Wilson’s observation, after the first decade of the Charter:
The process of constitutional analysis in Canada has revealed startling socio-political
facts of which account has had to be taken. The lessons learned have not been easy
ones. We have learned, for example, that serious inequalities of power and resources
exist within the family such that we can no longer regard the preservation of the
family in its present state as an unqualified good. We have come to appreciate that
. . . framing constitutional questions and answers within existing doctrinal categories
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Referring back to this observation, Justice L’Heureux-Dube observes that in seeking to fulfill the
Charter’s mandate, the Canadian Supreme Court has “pierced the veil of the family when public
values are at stake, but at the same time . . . respected the family’s private sphere and . . . ensured
that it is a haven for all sorts of interpersonal combinations.”74 The latter part of this observation
refers, in part, to the Court’s evolving protection of the intimate and family lives of gay men and
lesbians. This is evident in such cases as M v. H., which also led to statutory reforms extending
benefits to same-sex partners, as well as in a number of provincial courts ruling that, under the
Charter’s equality provisions, same-sex marriage must be permitted. Curiously, Hirschl describes
such protection as simply that of negative liberty (122-23), though many of the courts’ decisions
involve making various forms of benefits and protections available to parties in a same-sex
relationship. 
Is this account of the Charter and the role of courts too optimistic? Describing herself as a
“charter pragmatist,” Majury stresses the significance of the Charter as affording a forum, not simply
for bringing specific cases, but also for bringing important matters to the foreground and offering
opportunity for education about such matters.75 At least with respect to women’s equality, she
concludes that both “celebration and equivocation” are in order. 
Finally, to return to Hirschl’s focus on distributive justice, feminist assessments of the
Charter would concur that courts have not generally recognized positive socio-economic rights.
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Majury observes that “drastic government cutbacks and draconian revisions to social programs” have
led groups to go to courts to seek redress. But, even though “poverty is one of the most glaring
inequalities of Canadian contemporary society and is intimately related with the other section 15
[equality] grounds,” courts have not, for the most part, found economic inequality to trigger the
Charter’s equality provisions.76 The task, in her view, for equality and social justice advocates is to
find ways to challenge not only the restraints of the Charter itself but also the restraints of society’s
prevailing social values concerning social justice and inequality. Charter pragmatists recognize that
litigation, even if it triggers progressive decisions, does not eliminate the need for broader social
action to remedy social injustice and systemic economic disadvantage.77
South Africa and the Constitutional Revolution: The Constitution’s Transformative Project
In including the South African constitutional revolution among his four examples, Hirschl
admits that he faces a “most difficult case” in questioning conventional views concerning the role
of progressivism both in the origins and consequences of the move to constitutionalism. (10) For the
South African Constitution is regarded as one of the most progressive and far-reaching in explicitly
including not only negative liberties but also positive rights.78 And Hirschl’s review of bill of rights
40
79Constitution, Article 27 (2) (discussed in Hirschl, 130-34).
80Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Constitutional Claims for Gender Equality in South Africa: A
Judicial Response, 67 ALBANY L. REV. 565, 566 (2003).
claims finds a higher success rate on positive rights claims in South Africa than in those brought in
the other three countries. (Indeed, the success rate is higher than negative rights claims in the other
three countries!) (106-07) He acknowledges that the Constitution not only declares a number of
positive rights but also imposes upon the state the obligation to “take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.”79 Hirschl discusses the Court’s mixed record in addressing claims that the legislature has not
fulfilled its obligations. But, to recall our argument above about the missing discourse of
constitutions outside the courts, he does not address other dimensions of constitutionalization, such
as the enactment of legislation and formation of various commissions to advance constitutional
rights. Here again, in questioning whether a broader conception of progressive social change might
challenge Hirschl’s conclusions, we will focus on the impact of constitutionalism on gender equality
and family law.
As in the case of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, so too in South Africa women’s
groups played a role in the constitution-making process. As the drafting process began, Justice
Yvonne Mokgoro observes, “a strong and formidable women’s movement ensured that gender
equality was placed firmly on the agenda.”80 Women’s organizations had, historically, directed their
attention toward the eradication of apartheid, but as constitutional negotiations ensued, the Women’s
National Coalition lobbied for the new constitution to affirm a principle of gender equality and
41
81Saras Jagwanth and Christina Murray, “No Nation Can Be Free When One Half of It is
Enslaved,” in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 34, at 230-31;
Penelope Andrews, From Gender Apartheid to Non-Sexism: The Pursuit of Women’s Rights in South
Africa, 26 N. CAROLINA J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 693, 717-18 (2001).
82Jagwanth and Murray, supra note 81, at 230 (quoting “State of the Nation Address,”
Parliament, 24 May 1994, available at www.polity.org.za).
83Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), §1 (emphasis added).
84Mokgoro, supra note 80, at 567.
85The Constitution, §16 (2)( c)). 
address women’s issues.81 President Nelson Mandela declared that “freedom cannot be achieved
unless women have been emancipated from all forms of oppression.”82 Notably, the Constitution,
enacted in 1996, describes South Africa as “one sovereign state founded on the . . . values [of]
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-
racialism and non-sexism.”83 It protects a “right to equality,” and also bars “unfair discrimination”
– whether direct or indirect, on such bases as race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, sexual orientation, culture, belief, language, disability, and birth. As Justice Mokgoro
points out, the concern for the rights of women goes beyond this equality provision, for the Bill of
Rights also includes a right to freedom from all forms of violence, “from either public or private
sources,” and protects rights to “make decisions concerning reproduction.”84 
Of particular relevance to feminist assessments of constitutionalism’s capacity to address
inequality in the private sphere is that the Constitution affirms that “everyone has the right to . . .
participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights” – for example, with its protection of
sex equality.85 So, too, in contrast to the apartheid regime, it recognizes marriages under any
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traditional, religious, personal, or family law system, but such marriages must be consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. In short, as Mokgoro concludes, the Constitution, in embracing both
a right to culture and a right to sex equality, and in recognizing customary marriage subject to the
requirements of sex equality, attempts a “process of harmonization” that accords respect to “cultural
normative systems that conflict with equality,” such as customary marriage, but also disposes of their
“oppressive effect, particularly on women.”86
Why frame these commitments as in tension with each other and as requiring harmonization?
Hirschl’s account focuses on the ANC’s compromise on positive rights and its firm protection of
property in order to reassure domestic and foreign capital about the stability of the new regime. But
a focus on sex equality and family law would direct attention, on the one hand, to the efforts by
traditional leaders to exempt customary law from the reach of the Constitution – lest the Bill of
Rights harm “entrenched cultural values” – and, on the other, to rural women’s demands for an end
to various forms of sex inequality associated with the South African apartheid legal system and
customary law.87 Attempts to characterize customary law and culture are controversial, in part
because such attempts often privilege the voice of patriarchal leaders at the expense of dissenting
views in ways that, during apartheid, reinforced African women’s inequality.88 But relevant legal
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codes ostensibly based on customary law assign married women the legal status of a minor and/or
allocate marital authority to husbands, limiting women’s capacity to contract or own property;
customary law also follows a rule of primogeniture and a model of patriarchal social relations.89 The
disadvantages faced by black women under African customary law, in combination with the poverty
and inequality linked to colonialism and apartheid rule, “has led to a particularly detrimental effect
on the socio-economic power and well-being of rural women.”90 Moreover, when decision making
is patriarchal, it excludes women “from becoming engaged in activities at the local government level
and making decisions that will have a profound effect, not only on their own lives, but on their
communities as a whole.”91 Thus, women’s demands included calls for an end to primogeniture,
equal representation on local government and development councils, the abolition of polygamy, joint
registration of all marital property, and an independent right to land.92 
How has the constitutionalization process in South Africa addressed the problem of women’s
inequality? How has it dealt with the tension between women’s equality and respect for culture and
customary law? More generally, what has been the impact of constitutionalization on forms of
inequality in the private sphere, including in the family?
South Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence (at times drawing on Charter jurisprudence)
stresses a commitment to substantive equality, not simply formal equality, and to examining patterns
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of disadvantage and specific social and economic conditions.93 Indeed, South African legal scholars
speak of the South African Constitution as committed to “a transformative project” and of the
Constitutional Court as developing “an indigenous jurisprudence of transformation.”94 Such a
transformation involves, they contend, “the eradication of systemic forms of domination and material
disadvantage based on race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality.”95 The Preamble, for
example, speaks of healing “the divisions of the past” and “establishing a society based on
democratic values, social justice, and fundamental human rights.”96
But responsibility for the Constitution’s transformative project does not rest only with the
courts. Illustrating the importance of constitutions outside the courts, for example, the Constitution
establishes six state institutions to “support constitutional democracy.”97 One is the Commission on
Gender Equality, which, according to its mandate, is to “promote respect for gender equality and the
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protection, development and attainment of gender equality.”98 The Commission declares its values
include equality, defined as “adherence to principles and practices that promote substantive
equality,” and empathy, defined as “awareness of power relations and respect for human dignity.”99
If progressive social change includes, as we suggest, addressing forms of systemic inequality in
private life, then the Commission’s stated aims certainly appear progressive: they include assessing
and monitoring the promotion of gender equality by “civil society” and “the public and private
sectors” and “reaching out to the community” to seek to alter attitudes about gender equality.100 But,
as feminist scholars observe, a lack of resources has limited the effectiveness of the Commission’s
educational and litigation missions, driving home the point that even the most progressive
constitutional ideals are not self-implementing.101 
How has a commitment to substantive equality, along with a principle of protecting
vulnerable groups, reshaped South African family law? Consider the problem of domestic violence
– a clear example of how oppression and domination in the “private” sphere hinder a person’s
freedom to live a decent life. Surely, constitutional and legislative commitments to address this
problem would be progressive. The new Constitution protects freedom of the person against
violence, whether from a public or private source. In enacting laws to implement this constitutional
guarantee, such as the Prevention of Family Violence Act, the legislature included a very expansive
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definition of “domestic relationships,” leading to protecting persons “in a wide range of de facto
relationships that go far beyond conventional civil marriages.”102 Legislation also imposes new duties
and responsibilities on the South African Police Services to assist complainants who seek help after
an act of domestic violence. As some commentators observe: “These provisions illustrate the
interventionist character of the statute. In the tug of war between the dignity and the bodily integrity
of the complainant and the traditional privacy of the family home, the former values clearly hold
sway.”103 Similarly, in upholding a provision of earlier legislation, the high court observed that
“despite the high value set on the privacy of the home and the centrality attributed to intimate
relations, all too often the privacy and intimacy end up providing both the opportunity for violence
and the justification for noninterference.” The court also observed that, “to the extent that it is
systemic, pervasive, and overwhelmingly gender-specific, domestic violence both reflects and
reinforces patriarchal domination, and does so in a particularly brutal form.”104 The South African
Law Commission articulated the public’s interest in the pervasive problem of domestic (private)
violence, noting that it “violates our communities’ health, welfare, and economies by draining
billions annually in social costs such as medical expenses, psychological problems, lost productivity,
and intergenerational violence.”105 In sum, on Hirschl’s own view, this willingness to intervene in
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the private sphere – rather than to defer to power relations there – appears to be progressive.106 
A second example of the impact of constitutional commitments upon family law in South
Africa is the growing protection of persons on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status.
Hirschl discusses this development, claiming that although formal equality based on “sexual
preference” is thought to be a hallmark of progressive constitutional rights jurisprudence, it really
reflects the triumph of negative liberty and of protection of a private sphere free from governmental
regulation. (102) This argument may be apt with respect to decriminalizing sodomy, that is, freedom
from prosecution, but it is less apt for some of his other examples in which rights seem to entail
freedom to, not just freedom from. For example, Hirschl reports a series of decisions by the South
African Constitutional Court invalidating laws that: provide benefits to spouses of heterosexual
public employees but not same-sex life partners of judges; restrict joint adoption to married couples;
and afford a different status to a child born to a married couple through artificial insemination than
to one born to same-sex partners through such insemination. (124-25) These are not simply negative
liberties; they are entitlements to equal treatment by the state with respect to affirmative benefits that
flow from relationship status. Moreover, the rationale for some of these decisions has been not
simply leaving people alone, but respecting the constitutional right to dignity, and in cases involving
children, fostering the best interests of the children involved.107 
As Hirschl notes, a series of decisions under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
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has also recognized the rights of same-sex partners to equal treatment under various statutory laws
regulating family rights and responsibilities (e.g., spousal support). Just beyond the time period
covered by Hirschl’s book, we can now add decisions by the various constitutional courts concluding
that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’s guarantees require allowing same-sex couples to marry.
Surely marriage involves “freedom to,” not simply “freedom from.”108 For example, the Court of
Appeals for Ontario concluded that exclusion from marriage “perpetuates the view that same-sex
relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships” and “offends the dignity
of persons in same-sex relationships.”109 True, as Hirschl writes, such cases affirm a “sameness”
principle, but it is a right to equal benefit, not simply an equal right to be let alone. Only a quite
narrow conception of progressive change would conclude that these Canadian and South African
decisions are not within its ambit.110
A third example of the impact of constitutionalism on sex equality and family life in South
Africa is efforts to address the evident tension, within the Constitution, of the twin commitments to
women’s equality and to customary forms of marriage. The Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act of 1998, which took effect in 2000, repealed laws from the apartheid era concerning African
women in customary marriages and declared that a wife in a customary marriage, “on the basis of
equality with her husband,” has “full status and capacity” with respect to acquiring assets, disposing
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of them, entering into contracts, and litigating.111 The Act itself evidences progressive social change
altering inequality in the realm of family life. In addition, the process leading to the Act usefully
challenges Hirschl’s argument that constitutionalism wrongly removes from the deliberative process
important issues of self-definition and nation-building. To propose reforms to bring the status of
women under customary law into harmony with the constitutional equality provision, the South
African Law Commission sponsored consultations and hearings on the issue of customary
marriage.112 It included consultation with traditional authorities, who invoked “culture” to argue
against according women greater decision-making roles in society. And it included “women’s
equality and legal reform advocates,” who “voiced their opposition to women’s status as minors
under customary law and to the system of primogeniture more generally.”113 
Out of this process came a political compromise. Significant steps toward affirming women’s
equality included recognizing women’s contractual and proprietary capacity and deeming both
spouses to hold property as community property, and giving women equal rights to initiate divorce
proceedings, and equal guardianship and custody rights to married parents. At the same time, the
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that abolishing it would leave women in polygynous marriages unprotected. But certain measures
were approved to afford an existing wife protection before her husband can marry another wife.114
This example suggests that constitutionalism need not shut down deliberation about
important, contentious matters. Indeed, political theorist Monique Deveaux offers this process as an
important example of the potential of “a deliberative approach to resolving disputes about contested
cultural practices,” one that emphasizes inclusive debate and uses negotiation and compromise to
produce “fair and equitable” – even if illiberal – outcomes.115 However, commenting on Deveaux’s
account, Susan Moller Okin questioned whether the process – by giving a role to tribal leaders as
leaders or representatives of leaders – gave leaders far more than equal power, thus failing to meet
Deveaux’s proposed criteria of “non-domination and political equality.”116 Other feminist scholars
contend that the Law Commission’s process heavily privileged “the voices of traditional leaders and
legal anthropologists” and tended to treat the views of women’s groups (for example, their
opposition to polygyny) as reflecting “western norms and values,” rather than an attempt to offer an
alternative definition of and challenge to African culture.117 This feminist debate suggests the
importance of an approach to deliberative process – and to the development of customary law itself
under the new Constitution – that finds ways to support voices offering dissenting and dynamic
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interpretations of culture.118
In sum, these examples suggest that constitutionalization has been an impetus to at least some
progressive change in South Africa in the areas of women’s equality and family law. To be sure,
Hirschl correctly argues that there is a sizeable gap between the many positive rights included in the
South African Constitution and the economic conditions in which black South Africans continue to
live. A scarcity of economic resources, Justice Makguro suggests, has been a major factor hindering
the implementation of the Constitution’s reforms.119 Moreover, “the privatized nature of the South
African economy and the imperatives of a market driven agenda may undermine the transformative
possibilities of the Constitution” in overturning structural inequality.120 But Hirschl himself notes
that it is too soon to rule out such transformation. Thus, in 2002, the high court issued a “potentially
revolutionary judgment” invoking the constitutional right to health care to require the distribution
to pregnant women with HIV/AIDS of a drug to reduce the risk of transmission. (132-33).121 Similar
to the Charter pragmatists, Justice Mokgoro also cautions to look not only to courts but also to
legislatures for progressive social change: because litigation “tends to be the privilege of the
economically empowered,” a “vigilant civil society” should “agitate for change and monitor
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implementation” through “more accessible and direct strategies,” such as legislation and policy
development.122 
VI. Conclusion
Hirschl’s Towards Juristocracy is one of the most ambitious books ever written in the field
of comparative constitutional law. It makes important and sobering arguments concerning the origins
and consequences of the new constitutionalism. These arguments no doubt will spark and shape
further inquiry for years to come. In offering these criticisms, we aim to help clarify and narrow his
arguments and to suggest fruitful lines of inquiry.
